Operation Harpoon by Martin Bourne

Operation Harpoon by Martin Bourne

Author:Martin Bourne [Bourne, Martin]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Vandering Publications
Published: 1997-08-01T04:00:00+00:00


The opening clashes. Above: Malaya swings wildly to avoid torpedo-bombers. Below: A stick of bombs just misses the Argus.

Photographs courtesy of the Imperial War Museum.

Just before 2000 another coordinated attack on the same pattern developed. About twenty Italian SM-79’s came in low from the north-east, circled round the stern of the convoy out of gun range, then attacked the starboard side. Simultaneously, ten German JU-88s came in high ahead and dropped bombs along the entire length of the convoy, while fifteen JU-87’s attacked the port side. The convoy countered by more emergency turns to keep their sterns to the torpedo attacks, but they were hampered by already being in some disarray. The escorts had been prosecuting a suspected submarine contact and were not in ideal positions. Most of the attacks concentrated on a group isolated two miles out consisting of Malaya, Argus, Charybdis and Vidette. A wild melee ensued, with aircraft chasing around the ships and the sky full of tracer. The powerful JU-88 proved to be a formidable opponent for the slow Fairey Fulmar. Nonetheless no damage was done, although Argus had to dodge three torpedoes.

At 2100 four Beaufighters from Malta made an appearance. It was a heartening sight for the defenders, because the Skerki channel had been reached, and, as planned, Force W was detached back to Gibraltar. At they turned the Italian submarine Alagi attacked the Eagle but missed, then escaped undetected.

The convoy redeployed into a single line and, under the command of acting-captain Hardy, steered south east to keep as close as possible to the Tunisian coast. At 2130, in the dusk, they were subjected to a last unsuccessful air attack.

At almost the same time the Italian 7th Cruiser squadron was sailing from Palermo with orders to intercept the convoy south of Pantellaria. The Italian cruisers were duly spotted by British aircraft, but their course was not determined. Shadowing proved to be impossible owing to a shortage of reconnaissance aircraft and the preoccupation with watching Taranto. Suspecting that Da Zara’s force might be sailing to reinforce the main Italian fleet, air patrols were instead concentrated over the straits of Messina.

The night passed quietly for the convoy, but Curteis had plenty to think about. By the time reports of the sailing of the 7th Cruiser division reached him the two British forces were fifty miles apart. If these vessels were steering to attack the convoy Hardy's covering force would be heavily outgunned. One of the Force W cruisers could be detached to assist, and with hard steaming it would just be able to support Hardy by morning. The difficulty was that Force W would still be within range of the Sardinian airbases for most of the following day and one less cruiser would seriously weaken its AA cover. Considering the narrow escapes of the carriers earlier in the day, and the value of even these obsolete vessels, Curteis eventually decided not to split his force. It was a decision that would be questioned later.

At dawn the convoy



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